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Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863 was a grave
mistake, on a variety of levels, which ultimately culminated in a crippling defeat at Gettysburg.
After the Army of Northern Virginia successfully defended southern territory against northern
attacks, the transition to an offensive strategy, advancing north in to Pennsylvania was a vast
miscalculation. Lee’s army now traversed enemy territory, leaving behind the advantages of a
campaign on southern territory and abandoning a defensive posture. This transition to fighting
on enemy territory brought several difficulties that Lee seemingly overlooked, and presented
challenges for which Lee was unprepared. Lee sought to bring the fighting, which was primarily
on Southern soil, in to Northern territory, in hopes of breaking the will of Northerners and
forcing the Federal government in to suing for peace. However, while in Pennsylvania, Lee
continuously miscalculated enemy positions, all the while compromising his own while moving
among a hostile populace. While amongst that populace, which Lee hoped would help push for
capitulation upon seeing the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania, Lee’s men found
themselves at a significant intelligence and psychological disadvantage. Lee’s push north in
pursuit of one decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac ultimately failed to achieve its
ultimate goal. This illusive triumph very likely could have been successfully achieved through
other means, and should not have been sought after at the expense of a crushing defeat such as
that the Army of Northern Virginia experienced at Gettysburg. Lee’s move into Pennsylvania
proved foolhardy, as he failed to appropriately supervise his commanders, calling in to question
his own capabilities as a General. These questions about Lee’s competency and capabilities
litter the historical record when examining the Pennsylvania campaign, and functionally reshape
the legacy of the General Lee. Ultimately, Lee sought recognition through success on Northern
soil, but misjudged how attainable a decisive victory up North would be. As the Federal

2

government considered relenting to a peace agreement, the push north into Pennsylvania by the
Lee’ army, riding high on victorious engagements in Virginia, forced the North’s hand, all the
while Robert E. Lee was overplaying his own.
The 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania placed General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate forces in
the unenviable position of fighting on enemy territory. Forcing an attack on Northern soil was a
gamble, to say the least, even for a seasoned military opportunist like Lee. The Confederates
were facing Northern opposition on multiple fronts. Federal forces were experiencing significant
successes in the West, which provided added pressure. The Southern economy was declining
precipitously from the harmful effects of war, as agricultural production was stymied by the
conflict. Nevertheless, Lee saw advantages both in leaving war-ravaged Virginia, and in
entering the resource rich Cumberland Valley. The problems that arose from operating in enemy
territory, and transitioning from a defensive to offensive posture were seemingly overlooked.
The Army of Northern Virginia’s movement in to Pennsylvania was accompanied by a bevy of
issues not present or nearly as pronounced while fighting on Southern territory, as their position
in Pennsylvania would become inherently disadvantageous. This inherent disadvantage can be
exemplified by Lee’s inability to ascertain effective intelligence regarding Northern positions,
and act accordingly. A large disparity of valuable intelligence would emerge between the two
warring sides, as while Lee was hard-pressed for accurate intel regarding troop movements,
Northern forces were acutely aware of Lee’s army’s positioning. The movements of Lee’s army,
outside of the friendly confines of Southern territory, was no longer going unnoticed or
unaccounted for. Historians have since outlined various aspects of this significant disadvantage
Lee found himself faced with while operating in Northern territory. One historian, Jacob Hoke,
notes that Federal General Joseph Hooker greatly benefited from “home-field advantage” and the
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ability to utilize civilian intelligence. These are advantages conversely forfeited by Lee during
his offensive. Hoke acknowledges the significance of this inherent tactical for General Hooker:
Unlike Lee, who was in enemy’s country, with a hostile population all about him who
reported to the authorities his every movement, and his eyes bandaged because of the
absence of calvary, and therefore compelled to feel his way, Hooker was not under the
necessity of this caution, nor of guessing his enemy’s intentions, but could act promptly
and intelligently.1
Lee’s decision to invade Pennsylvania left his positions easily relayed to his enemy, while
Federal troops operated swiftly and in manners too often unbeknownst to Lee. This is a marked
change from conflicts in Virginia, many of which culminated in Southern success. Aided by the
aforementioned advantage, Federal troops could march more decisively. Lee’s guessing game
regarding enemy positions would come back to haunt him at Gettysburg. This would create a
necessity for increased oversight of his Generals, making effective communication down the
chain of command absolutely critical. Lee’s decision to invade Pennsylvania cemented this
disadvantage as a constant in 1863, as it continued to plague their offensive as it progressed.
Upon entering Pennsylvania, Lee would grow accustomed to maneuvering blindly. This
itself is an untenable position, one which Lee should have avoided at all costs. This raised both
serious tactical considerations, and proceeded to strain the chain of command within his forces.
Lee’s subordinate, General James Longstreet, repeatedly notes in his writings that when Lee
does receive intel regarding Federal forces, it is insufficient in frequency, and furthermore
General Lee declines to credit it.2 When the scout comes to Lee with intelligence as late into the
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campaign as June 29th, 1863, Hoke asserts “that this was the first information of the whereabouts
of the Army of the Potomac which Lee received after entering Pennsylvania.” 3 General
Longstreet takes it a step further, going so far as to call to question Lee’s understanding of his
own location, while noting the uncertainty regarding the whereabouts of Federal forces: “We had
not heard from the enemy for several days, General Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed,
we did not know that he had left Virginia.” 4 This should be a nightmare scenario for a military
tactician of Robert E. Lee’s venerated stature, yet Lee pushed forward, in part due to the
aforementioned pressures weighing on the Confederate cause. Soon this intelligence blackout
and positional uncertainty came to define the offensive in Pennsylvania, permeating into any
strategic considerations made in the decisive Gettysburg campaign. As renowned Civil War
historian Bruce Catton puts it, as Gettysburg progressed Lee “could never be sure where the
Yankees were.”5 For a vaunted General like Lee to operate under such pretenses is peculiar, if
not utterly unacceptable on its face. Longstreet’s first-hand account is in accordance with that of
Bruce Catton, attesting to Lee’s lack of awareness of enemy positioning and movements. After
the first day of battle at Gettysburg came to a close, Lee’s uncertainty continued according to
Longstreet:
When I left General Lee, about seven o’ clock in the evening, he had formed no plans
beyond that of seizing Culp’s Hill as his point from which to engage, nor given any
orders for the next day, though his desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to
serious apprehensions. He had heard nothing of the movements of the enemy since his
crossing the Potomac, except the report of the scout. 6
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General Longstreet is understandably troubled by Lee’s uncertainty and indecisiveness on the
eve of another pivotal battle. This contention seems to denote that Lee was unprepared or illequipped during the Battle of Gettysburg. After a decisive defeat, Longstreet’s writing would
likely seek to abscond from the responsibilities of failure, but as an active participant and close
confidante of Lee’s his account is not easily discounted. It is worth noting that Bruce Catton also
rebukes Longstreet leadership at Gettysburg, asserting that at this point of the conflict
“Longstreet was sulky and moved with less than his usual speed.”7 While General Longstreet is
not without incentive to deflect blame towards Lee, nevertheless this state of confusion attributed
to Lee is tellingly parroted by Lee’s own reports about the matter. While Longstreet would
benefit from highlighting Lee’s shortcomings and incompetence, Lee himself surely would not.
Lee’s report on the Battle of Gettysburg seemingly affirms notions propagated by Longstreet,
and Catton, as Lee recounts:
It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the
army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army,
Under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its
proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked
without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted
by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.8

Both Lee and Longstreet acknowledged the debilitating nature of this positional disadvantage, as
well as the often-crippling strategic considerations it fostered. Here Lee admits to being naïve as
to General Meade’s location and proximity to his own forces. Lee’s decision to invade
Pennsylvania placed Confederate forces firmly on Northern soil. This not only was to the
detriment of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, but also worked conversely to the benefit of the
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Army of the Potomac. Thus, this disadvantage is even further exemplified when it is juxtaposed
and compounded with advantages Lee’s aggression afforded Federal forces. Authoritative
historian James McPherson seems to concur with Catton’s critique of Lee at Gettysburg, while
contrasting supposed Southern ineptitude with Northern prowess:
The Confederate assaults on July 2 were uncoordinated and disjointed. The usual skill of
generalship in the Army of Northern Virginia was lacking this day. On the Union side,
by contrast, officers from Meade down to regimental colonels acted with initiative and
coolness. They moved troops to the right spots and counterattacked at the right times. 9
Here McPherson praises General Meade, who to that point was largely seen as a disappointment.
The Northern war effort and Meade’s legacy are both bolstered by the seemingly reckless
positioning taken up by the Army of Northern Virginia. The notion that all Northern Generals,
with the exception of Grant, pale in comparison to Lee’s brilliance must be revisited after Lee’s
1863 invasion of the Pennsylvania territory. Historians like Edwin Coddington take a more
favorable view on Meade, particularly in light of his poise at Gettysburg. He remarks on
Meade’s prowess as a battlefield engineer, who went to great lengths to secure formidable
positioning, familiarizing himself with an area’s geography and topography. 10 Coddington’s
depiction of Meade at Gettysburg only further illuminates how a tactical disparity emerges as
Lee takes his army in to enemy territory, to the benefit of Generals like Meade, no longer
deemed ineffective. General Robert E. Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania was so miscalculated it
affords his counterpart the ability to redefine his own legacy. About General Lee’s counterpart
General Meade, Coddington continues:
(…) Meade prepared for any eventualities by arranging his army so as to be able to
maneuver it quickly and efficiently. As part of this program he issued important orders at
9
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11:00AM., which revealed how necessary it was to his well-disciplined mind to
accumulate all possible data before coming to a decision.11
General Lee, known for his competence and success, now saw a geographic and tactical role
reversal with his adversary General Meade, widely considered a disappointment prior. With the
current tactical disadvantage Lee’s decisions to march in to Pennsylvania engendered, Northern
forces found themselves well-positioned and poised for levels of success that previously alluded
them.
The emergence of a stark contrast between the Army of Northern Virginia’s previous
successes and the outcomes the Army experience in Pennsylvania is repeatedly remarked on by
historians. This tactical disparity in Pennsylvania was seemingly reversed before Lee’s decision
to pursue an offensive war posture. Fighting on Southern soil, Lee’s forces were seen as mobile,
disciplined, and well-positioned for engagements. The transition to an offensive posture no
longer made these attributes a given, effectively inversing the circumstances somewhat. The
Army of the Potomac was now able to hone in on Confederate positions, standing “as a wall of
steel between the Capital and its foes (…) ready to be swung around to meet whatever exigency
might arise.”12 Whereas Lee used conjecture to ascertain Hooker’s intentions and positions,
Hooker often operated acutely aware of Lee’s purposes and movements, which allowed him to
relocate his forces accordingly 13 Federal forces had eyes everywhere, relaying valuable
intelligence regarding positioning. Aggressively forcing the issue on Northern soil changed the
very dynamic of the conflict, so much so as to one must question the necessity of the move at all.
The Union army, coming off of defeat in both Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, were drawn
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by Lee from an aggressive offensive into defensive work in Pennsylvania.14 Even with mounting
pressure on the Confederacy, this was a massive gamble. This changing of roles for the two
opposing forces proceeded to shape the conflict as it continued into Pennsylvania.
While there was no shortage of Northern civilians to expose Southern positioning, the
disadvantage of pursuing an offensive amidst Northerners was multi-faceted. Simply relaying
the position of Southern forces was only one aspect of this severe positional and tactical
disadvantage. The same civilian population that served to provide the North with valuable intel
to the detriment of Lee, represented another serious, but often overlooked disadvantage for
Southern forces in Pennsylvania. There was no shortage of able-bodied males in Pennsylvania
yet to take up arms. In hopes of breaking their will, Lee’s movement amongst them would in
fact do the opposite. It worked to mobilize them, bringing more men in to the fray, so to speak.
This seemingly untapped resource was not lost on Confederate troops, who juxtaposed this
surplus of human capital with the Southern situation. The South had mobilized almost all
capable men in the war effort. Northern noncombatants at this point of the conflict were
comprised of a sizable contingent of men of fighting age. Southern forces were not pursuing
widespread hostility against civilian populations at this juncture, which put them at a
disadvantage when compared to the effectiveness of the “total war” strategy the Union adopted
by 1864, as it sought to destroy the Old South.15 While breaking the will of the Northerner may
have been more likely if the South adopted a similar strategy, Lee see him forces and cause as
honorable, and sought to maintain it as such. Southern honor and notions of just war often
precluded them from systematically engaging Northern civilians until they joined the fighting
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ranks. While troops acting on their own committed undeniable atrocities, as is the nature of war,
Lee largely condemned them. Southern troops were soon face-to-face with a new reality, which
undoubtedly hurt their morale. These Southerners in Pennsylvania were astonished to find that
the Northern fighting population was scarcely utilized yet by the Summer of 1863.16 One
Northern citizen cited by historian Jacob Hoke, when speaking with Southern Officers in front of
his residence remarked that:
Since you have come North that there are any number of able-bodied men yet to draw
upon, and the people here have scarcely yet awakened to the fact that there is a war upon
their hands; but this invasion will open their eyes to the fact, and if it were possible for
you to annihilate the whole of our armies now in the field, that would only bring out
another and larger one.17
Northern forces could still be replenished, especially when provoked by the hostile Southern
forces in among them. The South, by comparison, was stretched incredibly thin, already having
mobilized and exhausted their potential manpower. General Robert E. Lee’s forces couldn’t help
but remark on the abundance of potential soldiers they continuously encountered in their midst,
as there was “considerable discussion among them about the large number of men they had seen
since they had entered Pennsylvania.”18 This sight would have had a profound effect on
Southerners, some of which have never ventured out of their own localities. The Northern
populace was vastly superior as a resource, and acknowledging such would have been the
acceptance of a harsh demographic reality for Southern troops. This demographic imbalance
spelled disaster for the South’s long-term outlook, raising questions about the efficacy of their
cause. Nevertheless, what Lee saw as land with potentially bountiful resources to supply the
Army of Northern Virginia, was instead rife with a human commodity that the Army of the
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Potomac was yet to harvest. This seemingly ceaseless source of human capital would have
functionally unnerved Southern soldiers, who would find themselves increasingly having to
come to terms with the extended nature of Lee’s offensive campaign. The sight of Northernerso-plenty, in their own land, undoubtedly took a psychological toll on their Southern occupiers,
themselves spread increasingly thin on desperately needed manpower. Being on Northern soil
provided context and scope to the conflict. Like the Southerners, Northerners similarly
commented on the disparity in manpower and seemingly endless supply of potential troops for
the Northern cause. In the aforementioned exchange between a Northern commoner and
Southern Officers, the Northern citizen forecasts that the “war will continue as long as you
southern people are able to fight.”19 Barring the Federal government suing for peace, the North
could have physically fielded armies of men for years to come. While General Lee believed
pursuing decisive victory on Northern soil a worthy endeavor, he awakened both Southerners
and Northerners to unrealized aspects of the conflict. In addition to his belief that a decisive
victory on northern soil would usher in a peace agreement, Lee conjured up other rationale for
the move into Pennsylvania. Lee was faced with logistical issues, namely food shortages, which
prompted his desire to move on agricultural areas such as the Cumberland Valley. Southern
agriculture was ravaged from years of conflict, and Lee deemed the Cumberland Valley as
potentially fruitful. In doing so Lee overlooked the resident Northern population in these areas,
and the affect seeing Lee’s men would have on them (as well as them on Lee’s men). Southern
soldiers would come face to face with a Northern population that would appear to provide
seemingly endless reinforcements. Riding high off of triumphant victories in Virginia, this
experience in Pennsylvania provided a stark contrast, and would have been eye-opening for
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Lee’s men. Northern civilians, on the other hand, would have had an eye-opening experience of
their own. The sight of Southern troops on Northern soil drove home the harsh realities of war,
while simultaneously rallying Northerners to further support the Union cause. Lee’s hopes of
breaking the will of Northerners represent another miscalculation, and his decision to invade
Pennsylvania seemed to have the opposite effect.
As Lee’s forces advanced northward into Pennsylvania, new logistical challenges arose
for the seemingly overstretched Army of Northern Virginia. Supply lines would become
fragmented after Lee left Virginia, as it would become difficult to reinforce troops and ward off
Federal forces simultaneously. Furthermore, any attempts to retreat or fall back from established
forefront positioning in enemy territory would prove difficult. General Robert E. Lee’s official
account once again illuminates these tactical issues, that some would even call mistakes. Lee
admits that “it had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless
attacked. But coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the
mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous.” 20 Lee’s remarks
acknowledge both the logistic difficulties of resupply and hazards of a withdrawal attempt. Any
withdrawal while operating in Northern territory could not only be subject to harsh terrain, but
also complicated or impeded by surrounding Northern civilians. Confederate forces were thus
tasked with maintaining positions at times that were less than ideal. The Confederate soldiers
were weary of their harrowing positioning, and often keenly aware of the dangers it presented.
To backtrack through Pennsylvania would likely result in sizable losses, becoming more
dangerous the further Lee’s forces pushed into the state. The realities of a campaign in enemy
territory sowed considerable discord among Southern troops as “some of these men were
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overheard to express that they had run into a trap by coming over here, and would not be able to
get out again without severe loss.”21 Lee’s troops and subordinates were often acutely aware of
the shortcomings and the boldness of their invasion. This awareness itself is a commentary on
the efficacy of the campaign. General Lee, however, deemed this maneuver into Pennsylvania
worthwhile, overlooking the above listed drawbacks in favor of his own rationale. Lee saw the
push into Federal territory as potentially rendering positive results. He believed fighting in
Pennsylvania would give a much-needed reprieve to the war-torn areas in Virginia, in hopes that
they could once again resume substantive crop yields and agricultural production. Southern
farms in Virginia struggled to produce while occupied by troops, which partially explains the
aforementioned food shortage. Instead, Lee, now faced with resupply over vast distances and
expanses of enemy territory, found his army only further exacerbated in resupply. Nevertheless,
Lee pushed on in pursuit of the elusive, decisive victory on Northern soil, whatever the cost, that
he surmised would pressure the Federal government into capitulation.
While some of the shortcomings in General Robert E. Lee’s planning and execution
during the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania, could simply be attributed to a lack of prescience,
other inadequacies speak critically of his competence in leadership. This is specifically in
reference to the invasion, as to discount his military genius to that point would be both
ahistorical and foolhardy. He was widely regarded (then and now) as one of the greatest
Generals and leaders of fighting men in military history, and rightfully so. Yet in Pennsylvania,
his lack of foresight, brazenly waging a campaign in enemy territory, is only compounded by his
failure to adequately supervise and organized his commanders. General Robert E. Lee’s inability
to effectively communicate with and supervise his subordinates continues throughout the
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campaign in Pennsylvania, culminating in his critical defeat at Gettysburg. The aloof nature of
the relationship between Lee and Longstreet speaks to his inability to communicate effectively
with his subordinates. After victory at Fredericksburg Longstreet alludes to how his perception
of Lee was changing, as back then he still “had some trust and hope in the judgment of
superiors.”22 This decline in leadership capabilities should be factored into the historiography of
Lee, as well as the efficacy of the invasion of Pennsylvania. Longstreet’s writings show a level
of distrust in Lee’s leadership developing by the end of June 1863, noting that “General Lee’s
orders called his troops on converging lines towards Cashtown (…) but his orders did not
contemplate immediate movements beyond Cashtown.”23 Time and again Longstreet seems to
be looking for more pronounced and defined plans and strategies from General Lee, but instead
is faced with uncertainty. Longstreet, who is repeatedly left in the dark, understandably
questions Lee’s strategy, as from his point of view the Army of Northern Virginia lacks direction
and guidance. While he and General Lee are apparently not synced strategically, Lee keeps the
Confederate government in Richmond similarly unapprised as to his intentions various junctures.
In Longstreet’s writings he surmises that Lee begins to keep his plans, assuming he had them,
close to his chest while dealing with authorities in Richmond:
His early experience with the Richmond authorities taught him to deal cautiously with
them in disclosing his views, and to leave for them the privilege and credit of approving,
step by step, his apparently hesitant policy, so that his plans were disclosed little at a
time; and, finding them slow in approving them...24
General Robert E. Lee’s reluctance to communicate his plans with both his superiors and
subordinates, shows an inability to dole out responsibility to others, and signifies a marked
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change from his previous reliance on others, namely Stonewall Jackson. General Lee trusted in
Jackson and was unable to replicate that with other subordinates throughout the campaign in
Pennsylvania. After Jackson’s death Lee centralizes his command and takes on more
responsibility, all the while failing to administer as efficiently to those who counted on his
leadership. This centralization manifests itself in a lack of communication with subordinates at
crucial junctures at Gettysburg. How the battle would have played out with Jackson still in the
fold is anyone’s guess. Post-Jackson Lee takes on added responsibilities which rendered him
less effectively generally, as he oversaw what become almost fractured forces. Rather than
replacing Jackson and entrusting his successor with his responsibilities, Lee absorbs those
responsibilities himself. Historian Clifford Dowdey concludes Lee is ultimately unable to fill the
void left by Stonewall Jackson’s death in May of 1863:
Jackson’s place finally ‘was filled by Lee himself, who, like a father when the mother
dies, seeks to fill both her place and his own in the house.’ At Gettysburg, the first test by
arms without Jackson, Lee had not assumed this dual role. (…) trying to supervise
everything, he actually led nowhere, and the army felt the lack of a strong hand at the
controls. The overlong Confederate line consisted of three separate small armies
mismanaging three separate battles.25
Dowdey’s point suggests Robert E. Lee may have bitten off more than he can chew by invading
Pennsylvania, as he acknowledges his failure to supervise at Gettysburg. This critique of Lee is
exceedingly salient coming from a historian like Clifford Dowdey, who seems to at times almost
begrudgingly admit Lee’s failures. Dowdey routinely defends Lee, opting instead to call into
question the competence of those under his command. Of General James Longstreet, Dowdey
asserts that he selectively remembers events, choosing to forget those which reflect negatively
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upon him, such as Little Round Top.26 This makes it particularly noteworthy when Dowdey is
moved to comment on Lee’s inability to communicate with and supervise his subordinates.
Lee’s command at Gettysburg left little room for input, such as suggestions made by General
John Bell Hood. General Hood questioned the efficacy of an attack at Emmitsburg Road, but
was soon told to proceed by Longstreet, citing that “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the
Emmitsburg Road.”27 Historians at times have been critical of General Hood, the namesake for
the recently renamed Fort Hood, yet he served admirably, being severely wounded at Gettysburg
and Chickamauga. Bruce Catton, for example, while acknowledging General Hood’s serious
shortcomings in light of later promotion, deems Hood both provenly effective and suitable for
subordinate command.28 In Confederate private Sam Watkins’ memoir, of Hood he
sympathetically writes:
General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die had been cast. Our cause had been
lost before he took command. He fought with the fierceness of the wounded tiger and the
everlasting grip of the bull-dog.29
Setting General Hood’s later contributions (or failures) aside, he nevertheless was disregarded
by Lee, who failed to communicate effectively with his subordinate at a pivotal moment. While
the much-maligned Hood’s inadequacies, as well as Longstreet’s respective role in rejecting the
suggestion are pertinent, nevertheless a lack of communication becomes evident as the
Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania culminates at Gettysburg. This disconnect could not have
come at a worse time for both Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. With the decisive victory
General Lee so dutifully pursued at his doorstep, he continued to fall short in his command.
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General Robert E. Lee’s failures in supervision at Gettysburg are most evident when
examining the role of Cavalry Commander J.E.B. Stuart at the decisive defeat. Stuart famously
separated from Lee’s army at arguably the most critical juncture, much to the detriment of the
Army of Northern Virginia. Stuart’s actions have been examined time and again, but few
disagree that the rogue maneuver stifled Confederate hopes of victory. General Robert E. Lee,
without cavalry, found himself left painfully unaware of the movement of Federal forces. This is
yet another continuation of the aforementioned tactical disadvantaged Lee afforded. Stuart’s
actions are acknowledged by some Southern historians as “the great disaster of the Pennsylvania
campaign was [owed] to the course pursued by General Stuart.”30 One can’t help but wonder:
Could this disaster have been averted? While undoubtedly worthy of substantial blame, it is
ultimately Lee’s lack of oversight during the Battle of Gettysburg that continues to plague his
forces. Lee himself is fully aware of his responsibilities as a seasoned General. Stuart, for what
it’s worth, claims to Longstreet that Lee gave him the authority to make such a maneuver, as
Longstreet notes that “General Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers from
General Lee.”31 This leaves Lee in a trepidations position historically, regardless of the validity
of Stuart’s claim. Robert E. Lee is ultimately culpable in this scenario, however indirectly, for
failing to communicate with, supervise, or replace those under his command that jeopardize the
operational integrity of the Pennsylvania Campaign. Whether General Stuart’s alleged autonomy
is on good authority is beside the point. General Lee was unable to ensure his subordinate Stuart
protected the mountain passes and effectively related enemy locations. Lee’s culpability,
however indirect, is very real, according to historian Jacob Hoke.
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It will be seen from the foregoing that if General Lee is not directly responsible for the
course pursued by Stuart, he indirectly is, for he gave him discretionary power to pursue
whatever course his judgment dictated (…) [and] a prudent commander (…) would
scarcely have given such discretion to a subordinate upon the eve of an invasion of his
territory.32
Jacob Hoke emphasized both Lee’s failure to oversee operations, but also how untimely the
whole ordeal was. Longstreet’s account, which justifiably denotes Stuart’s move as both
questionable and hazardous,33 is seems to be in agreement with Hoke’s assessment:
The raid and the absence of the cavalry at the critical moment were severely criticized
through the army and the country. If General Stuart could have claimed authority of my
orders for his action, he could not have failed to do so in his official account. He offered
no such excuse, but claimed to act under the orders of his chief, and reported that General
Lee gave consent to his application for leave to make the march. So our plans, adopted
after deep study, were suddenly given over to gratify the youthful cavalryman’s wish for
a nomadic ride.34
In this excerpt, Longstreet alludes to the widespread criticism of General Stuart’s going rogue.
While Longstreet gives credence to the notion, he simultaneously affords responsibility to Lee.
While discussing the circumstances that led to defeat at Gettysburg, Bruce Catton upholds this
disconnect between Stuart and Lee as ultimately decisive:
Stuart’s absence had been expensive. (He finally reached Lee on the evening of the
second day of the battle.). Lee had been forced to fight before he was ready for it, and
when the fighting began he had not felt free to maneuver because, with Stuart away, he
could never be sure where the Yankees were. At the close of the first day’s fighting
Longstreet had urged Lee to move around the Federal left flank and assume a position
somewhere in the Federal rear that would force Meade to do the attacking, but with the
Knowledge he then had Lee could not be sure that such a move would not take him
straight to destruction. He had felt compelled to fight where he was, and when the
fighting came he desperately missed Stonewall Jackson (…)35
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This analysis by a respected historian such as Catton is particularly telling, as it notably
incorporates many of the aforementioned factors that in summation rendered the campaign
unsuccessful. Catton addresses the disconnect between Lee and his subordinates that was
engendered by poor planning, oversight, and communication. He stresses the impact of Stuart
and Lee failing to coordinated movements, while remarking on Lee’s indecisiveness and
inability to work constructively with Longstreet. He seems to suggest that Lee became almost
stubbornly stagnant. Fittingly, Catton’s excerpt closes by remarking on Lee’s inability to replace
Stonewall Jackson, and effectively administer to the subordinates following Jackson’s untimely
death.
Historians like Bruce Catton, with the benefit of decades of hindsight, have little issue
with calling the invasion of Pennsylvania unwise. Catton sees the ultimate defeat at Gettysburg
as proof enough that the whole campaign was a misstep, as he concludes that “Gettysburg ruined
a Confederate offensive and demonstrated that the great triumph on Northern soil which the
South had to win if it was to gain recognition abroad could not be won.” 36 Those under Lee’s
command seem to agree. By this point of the Pennsylvania Campaign, Longstreet remarks that
“Lee had lost his balance (…) [as] General Lee was not ready with his plans. He had not heard
from his calvary, nor the movements of the enemy further than the information from dispatch
captured during the night (…) [and] as soon as it was light enough to see, however, the enemy
was found in position on his formidable heights awaiting us.”37 General Lee fatefully
underestimated the necessity of supervising his subordinates, and thus his subordinates, like
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James Longstreet, note his purported incompetence in Pennsylvania on the historical record in a
manner that echoes the conclusions of contemporary historians.
Following the defeat at Gettysburg, the historiography surrounding the loss, and to whom
fault it should be contributed, has cast aspersions on both General Lee and his commanders. Lee
has been seen as attempting to obfuscate his responsibility for the defeat at times, as Longstreet
notes:
General Lee said, ‘Longstreet is the hardest man to move in my army.’ It does not look
like generalship to lose a battle and a cause and then lay the responsibility upon others.
He held command and was supported by his government. If his army did not suit him,
his word could have changed it in a minute. If he failed to apply the remedy, that was his
fault. Some claim that his only fault as a general was his tender, generous heart. But a
heart in the right place looks more to the cause entrusted to its care than for hidden ways
by which to shift its responsibility to the shoulders of those whose lives hang upon his
word.38
Longstreet, however does not stop there in his criticism. He seemingly insinuates Lee was a
shadow of his former self at Gettysburg:
We were left to our own resources in finding ground upon which to organized for the
battle. The enemy had changed position somewhat after the march was ordered, but as
we were not informed of this position before the march, we could not know of the
change. The Confederate commander did not care to ride near us, to give information of
a change, to assist ill preparing for attack, nor to inquire if new and better combinations
might be made.39
Lee’s inadequacy is undoubtedly magnified by the many difficulties that arose from the
complexities of an offensive in Federal Territory, as Lee was fresh off of significant success
elsewhere. Lee’s capacity during the decisive engagement of the campaign is similarly called
into question by news publications. According to prominent Civil War historian James
McPherson, Lee’s decline, performance, and decision making began to come in to question in
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Southern publications that may have previously fawned over Lee. McPherson remarks on how
“some newspapers, especially the Charleston Mercury, did express more than slight doubts about
Lee’s capacity and conduct in the Gettysburg Campaign. Perhaps stung by this criticism, and
experiencing health problems, Lee offered his resignation in a letter to Davis on August 8.”40 In
Lee’s letter of resignation, he attempted to resign more than just his command. He seems
resigned to the fact that he himself believes the Pennsylvania Campaign to be a failure, and
arguably a tactical misstep from its inception. Of Lee’s acknowledgment of his own
shortcomings, James McPherson writes:
Lee was profoundly depressed by the outcome of his campaign to conquer a peace. A
month later he offered his resignation to Jefferson Davis. ‘No one,’ wrote lee, ‘is more
aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even
accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others?’ (…) Of
course Davis refused to accept his resignation. Lee and his men would go on to earn
further laurels. But they never again possessed the power and reputation they carried into
Pennsylvania those palmy midsummer days of 1863. Though the war was destined to
continue for almost two more bloody years, Gettysburg and Vicksburg proved to have
been its crucial turning point. 41

Bruce Catton and McPherson, arguably the two preeminent Civil War historians to date, are in
agreement in this regard. Catton affirms McPherson’s contention, attesting that “losing at
Gettysburg, the Confederates had lost more than they could well afford to lose … [and] at
Vicksburg they lost what they could not afford at all”42 With prominent historians, Lee’s
contemporaries, and Lee himself all documenting the abject failure of the Pennsylvania
campaign, it becomes apparent that Lee’s decision to invade Pennsylvania was in error.
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The 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania and Gettysburg campaign were failures the
Confederacy could not bear at a crucial point of the Civil War. By analyzing the work of
historians, General Robert E. Lee’s subordinates, and Lee’s own writings, it becomes evident
that the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania was a mistake, one so grave that it ultimately doomed the
Confederate cause. Robert E. Lee sought a decisive victory on Northern soil in hopes that it
would force the Federal government to sue for peace. In pursuit of this victory, he marched the
Army of Northern Virginia in to Pennsylvania, all the while over-looking major disadvantages
such a move afforded, as well as their consequences. Lee miscalculated the difficulties that
would arise in mounting an offense on Northern soil after successes in Virginia. His forces
continued to operate with limited intelligence of the positions of the Army of the Potomac, while
his own movements were frequently transparent to the enemy. While amongst the northern
populace, various unintended consequences jeopardized the efficacy of his campaign. The
northern populace represented a potentially ceaseless stream of human capital, a resource the
South itself had stretched thin. His pursuit of the agricultural resources in the Cumberland
Valley brough his soldiers in to positioning that was tactically untenable. Lee continuously
mismanaged his command, lacking the oversight and leadership required to effectively wage the
offensive. Following the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee expanded his role, all the while failing
to effectively fill the void left behind. Lee, normally renowned for his leadership, left much to
be desired as his strategy, competency, and overall command in the invasion of Pennsylvania
soon become understandably questioned. These disadvantages and miscalculations manifest
ultimately in the defeat at Gettysburg, the most pivotal moment of the war to that point. While
evaluating whether or not the invasion was a mistake is aided by foresight, as the Confederate
cause obviously never came to fruition, the invasion on its own merit is flawed in the
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aforementioned aspects. The 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania represents one of the greatest
miscalculations made by one of history’s greatest Generals, and the primary and secondary
source historiography, when examined, has come to reflect such.

23

Bibliography

Catton, Bruce. The Civil War. Boston, M.A.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. New York, N.Y.: Simon &
Schuster, 1997.
Dowdey, Clifford. Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation. New York, N.Y.: Skyhorse
Publishing, 2011.
Dowdey, Clifford. The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee. Boston, M.A.: Little, Brown & Company,
1964.
Dowdey, Clifford. The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee. Boston, M.A.: Little, Brown & Company,
1961.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. New York, N.Y.: Simon &
Schuster, 1998.
Hoke, Jacob. The Great Invasion. Gettysburg, P.A.: Stan Clark Military Books, 1992.
Kegel, James A. North with Lee and Jackson: The Lost Story of Gettysburg. Mechanicsburg, P.A.:
Stackpole Books, 1996.
Lee, Robert E., Jr.: Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee, New York, N.Y.: CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.
Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America.
Philadelphia, P.A.: Project Gutenberg, 2011. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38418/38418h/38418-h.htm.
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2003.
McPherson, James M. Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Civil War. N.Y.:
Penguin Books, 2015.
United States War Department, Robert N Scott, H. M Lazelle, George B Davis, Leslie J Perry, Joseph
W Kirkley, Fred C Ainsworth, et al. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1891-1895.
Image. https://www.loc.gov/item/03003452/.
Watkins, Sam. Co. Aytch or, A Side Show of the Big Show, New York, N.Y..: Plume, 1999.

24

